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ARE ETFSMAKING SOMEASSETMANAGERS
TOO INTERCONNECTED TO FAIL?
Ryan Clements*
ABSTRACT
Exchange Traded Funds (ETF) are likely the most successful financial
products since the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC). Despite numerous
benefits, ETF’s success could be making some asset managers “too
interconnected to fail.” Interconnection is a core element of systemic risk,
and it played a material role in the transmission of economic shocks in the
GFC. This article is the first, in a growing body of literature on ETFs, to
provide a comprehensive inquiry into their systemic importance through the
lens of interconnectivity. The article provides three unique contributions.
First, it shows how ETFs are creating deep and complex interconnections
between numerous market participants and service providers, extending to
retail and institutional investors, and corporate behaviors and decisions.
Second, it illustrates how ETF interconnection creates direct and indirect
systemic risk transmission pathways, with unique factors not present in other
managed asset products, like the reliance on key market-incentivized
intermediaries in a crisis, crowd behaviors from correlated investment
exposures, information cascades, runs, fire sales, and non-linear impacts.
Finally, it shows how the effective monitoring of ETF systemic risk requires
a cross-market analysis to assess the collective behaviors of numerous
participants in a complex and interconnected operating ecosystem, and how
both activity and entity-level oversight is prudent in this market. While ETF
firms are distinct from banks and insurance companies, there’s merit in
safeguarding large firm’s economic resilience given their centrality in a
highly interconnected ecosystem. As such, ETFs illustrate the importance
of considering financial markets as a “system” when designing supervisory
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only word you could use is chaos, catastrophe . . . [t]he markets would fail.”8
This article is the first, in a growing body of literature on ETFs, to
provide a comprehensive inquiry into their systemic importance through the
lens of interconnectivity – a material factor in the GFC.9 Since 2008, highly
interconnected ETF mega firms have increased their influence and voting
power over nearly every publicly traded corporation in America.10 These
firms are fostering deep and complex interconnections between market
participants and service providers that trace down to retail investors, main
street, and corporate behaviors and decision making.11 ETFs are also giving
rise to a new subset of systemic risks that have both direct and indirect
transmission channels, and which don’t exist in other managed asset classes
(like those associated with the ETF arbitrage function and onset from short-
term directional and noise traders attracted to the intraday liquidity of
ETFs).12
Optimal financial market interconnectivity is difficult to assess since
interconnections can both absorb and amplify shocks.13 The ETF operating
structure integrates into a “tangled web” of a “genuine” global
interconnected financial system, and asset managers like ETF mega firms
may require a heightened macro-prudential focus in the future.14 ETF
systemic risk derives from the potential collective actions of numerous
interconnected market participants, experienced through phenomena like the
discretionary withdrawals of key market-incentivized intermediaries from
the ETF operating substructure in a crisis, and crowd behaviors from
correlated exposures creating information cascades, runs, fire sales, and non-
linear impacts.15
The Financial Stability Oversight Council’s (FSOC) activities, and
entity-based, regulatory frameworks for non-bank systemically important
financial institutions (non-bank SIFIs), when applied separately to ETF
firms, both have limitations. As other scholars have recently advocated,
8. David Thomas, A Warning from the Late John Bogle, FORBES (Feb. 12, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2019/02/12/a-warning-from-the-late-john-
bogle/#6c00a7d62b99 [https://perma.cc/J34P-SS45].
9. See infra Section II(iii).
10. See infra Section III(iv)(b).
11. See infra Section III(iv).
12. See infra Section IV.
13. See Andrew G. Haldane, Managing Global Finance as a System, MAXWELL FRY
ANNUAL GLOBAL FINANCE LECTURE, BIRMINGHAM UNIVERSITY (Oct. 29, 2014) at 3, 9,
available at https://www.bis.org/review/r141030f.pdf [https://perma.cc/GS3K-EPXB]
(discussing the evolution of the financial market into a complex and interwoven system that
is both “robust” and “fragile”).
14. See id. at 3–9.
15. See infra Section IV.
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activity and entity oversight should not be considered mutually exclusive,16
and this article will show how a “complementary approach”17 is also prudent
for the ETF market. The ETF ecosystem highlights the increasing
importance of regulating financial markets as a system.18 While ETF firms
are clearly distinct from banks and insurance companies, there’s merit in
ensuring they are economically resilient and have adequate safeguards given
their centrality in a highly interconnected system.19
The asset managers profiled in this article could be growing “too
interconnected to fail” and the most effective regulatory frameworks going
forward will need to ensure firm stability and look across the market to assess
and monitor the collective behavior of all participants. This study raises
post-GFC systemic concerns. It also complements other post-GFC
scholarship, which identifies a small number of highly interconnected mega-
banks sitting in the center of the leading central clearinghouses for
derivatives and dominating the derivatives dealer markets.20
This article proceeds by first establishing interconnectivity as a core
measure of financial market systemic risk on par (if not more important) than
size, and how disruptions at widely interconnected firms facilitated the GFC.
It then establishes several indicators of high interconnectivity and applies
them to the ETF market in Section III. This Section, after identifying
demand factors for ETFs, shows how these products facilitate complex
economic interconnections. Section IV illustrates how ETF
interconnectivity could contribute to systemic risk. Section V then canvasses
the challenge of regulating highly interconnected asset managers (like the
ETF mega issuers), including the limitations of both activities and entity-
based non-bank SIFI rules, and relevant alternative regulatory
considerations. The article concludes by considering the true costs of
16. See Jeremy C. Kress, Patricia-Ann McCoy & Daniel B. Schwarcz, Regulating
Entities and Activities: Complementary Approaches to Nonbank Systemic Risk, 92 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1455 (2019).
17. Id.
18. See Haldane, supra note 13, at 3–5.
19. See Mark Gilbert, Banks Get Stress Tested. So Should Asset Managers, BLOOMBERG
OPINION (July 4, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-07-04/banks-get-
stress-tested-so-should-asset-managers [https://perma.cc/TEL9-LRTN], see infra Section III.
20. See Dan Awrey, The Limits of Private Ordering Within Modern Financial Markets,
34(1) REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW 183, 234 (2014); Felix B. Chang, Second-
Generation Monopolization: Parallel Exclusion in Derivatives Markets, 3 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 657, 695-708 (2016); Nahiomy Alvarez & John McPartland, The Concentration of
Cleared Derivatives: Can Access to Direct CCP Clearing for End-users Address the
Challenge? FEDERALRESERVEBANKOFCHICAGOWORKINGPAPER 2019-06, (Aug. 20, 2019),
available at https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/working-papers/2019/2019-06 [https://
perma.cc/EG22-GCWV].
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liquidity transformation in ETFs.
II. DOES INTERCONNECTION INCREASE FINANCIALMARKET
SYSTEMICRISK?
i. Moving Beyond Size: When Firms Become “Too Interconnected to
Fail”
A “hallmark” of the modern financial system is its “complex links” and
deeply interconnected firms, whose operations transcend national borders
and encompass a wide range of activities, functions and transactions.21 Size
is not a complete measure of a financial institution’s importance in the larger
system.22 Highly interconnected financial institutions played a material role
in the fallout from the GFC, and the continued existence (and as this article
will suggest, the growing prevalence in the ETF sector) of complex and
highly interconnected firms creates ongoing concerns for financial
stability.23 The importance of high-interconnected financial firms to
economic stability has given rise to the concept of “too connected to fail” as
a factor potentially as germane as size when analyzing systemic risk.24
21. See Janet L. Yellen, Interconnectedness and Systemic Risk: Lessons from the
Financial Crisis and Policy Implications, REMARKS ATAMERICAN ECONOMICASSOCIATION /
AMERICAN FINANCE ASSOCIATION JOINT LUNCHEON, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA (January 4,
2013), available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/files/Yellen20130104
a.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8RV-JCED].
22. See Jonathan R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure Is an Option: An Ersatz-
Antitrust Approach to Financial Regulation, 120 Yale L.J. 1368, 1386–91 (2011).
23. See SYSTEMICRISKCOUNCIL, LETTER TO FINANCIAL STABILITYOVERSIGHTCOUNCIL,
RE: AUTHORITY TO REQUIRE SUPERVISION AND REGULATION OF CERTAIN NONBANK
FINANCIAL COMPANIES, RIN 4030-AA00, (May 21, 2019) available at https://www.regulatio
ns.gov/document?D=FSOC-2019-0001-0029 [https://perma.cc/7FH5-BRR7]; BETTER
MARKETS, LETTER TO FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, RE: AUTHORITY TO
REQUIRE SUPERVISION AND REGULATION OF CERTAIN NONBANK FINANCIAL COMPANIES, RIN
4030-AA00, 84 Fed. Reg. 9028 (May 24, 2019), available at https://www.regulations.gov/doc
ument?D=FSOC-2019-0001-0030 [https://perma.cc/K2WQ-AYCB]; CENTER FORAMERICAN
PROGRESS, LETTER TO FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, RE: FSOC INTERPRETIVE
GUIDANCE ON NONBANK FINANCIAL COMPANY DETERMINATIONS (May 13, 2019) available at
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FSOC-2019-0001-0017 [https://perma.cc/C6DY-
8WSY]; Patricia McCoy, Jeremy C. Kress, & Daniel Schwarcz, COMMENT OF LEGAL
SCHOLARS ONAUTHORITY TOREQUIRE SUPERVISION ANDREGULATION OFCERTAINNONBANK
FINANCIAL COMPANIES, RIN 4030-AA40 (May 13, 2019), available at https://www.regulatio
ns.gov/document?D=FSOC-2019-0001-0012 [https://perma.cc/33ZE-TG6L] (hereinafter
“Letter from Legal Scholars”).
24. See Paul Maidment, Too Connected to Fail, FORBES (Apr. 19, 2010), https://www.fo
rbes.com/2010/04/19/banks-regulation-risk-business-wall-street-notes-on-the-news-connect
ed.html#2c4946285fe7 [https://perma.cc/K2B5-F7NF].
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A firm’s size is a “relevant” but “nondeterminative” factor when
assessing its systemic importance.25 Post-crisis analysis by the European
Central Bank (ECB) has noted that “the network of the financial system” can
become very “vulnerable” and subject to shocks when a “highly connected”
network participant experiences material failure, and its interconnectedness
can amplify shocks across the entire network rather than absorbing them.26
Professor Steven Schwarcz has documented how a firm’s
“interconnectedness, size, and lack of substitutability” can magnify systemic
risk.27 Professors Schwarcz and Iman Anabtawi also note that inherent in all
systems are interconnected elements,28 and that the financial system (which
is a “law-related system”) has elements (like certain market participants and
service providers), which exhibit high levels of interconnectivity.29
ii. The Relationship Between Interconnection and Financial
Instability
Some argue that the history of financial crises is also a history of highly
interconnected firms, where system-wide risk, and market failure, is a “by-
product” of such interconnectedness.30 Others suggest that
interconnectedness is a key to the complexity (and potential fragility) of
today’s financial system.31 Douglas Elliot has argued that “[t]he more
connections a firm has with others, the more channels there are to transmit
problems.”32 Several studies have documented how connectivity was present
in prior crises.33 Janet Yellen suggests that interconnectedness was a
25. Kress, McCoy & Schwarcz, supra note 16, at 1469.
26. EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, Recent Advanced in Modelling Systemic Risk Using
Network Analysis, 6 (January 2010), available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/m
odellingsystemicrisk012010en.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q43P-NKCV].
27. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systematic Regulation of Systemic Risk, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 1,
14 (2019).
28. Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address
the Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEX. L. REV. 75, 78–80 (2013).
29. Id. at 84.
30. Alexander Goodenough, Dodd-Frank: Regulating Systemic Risk in the Offshore
Shadow Banking Industry, 3 GEO. MASON J. INT’LCOM. L. 137, 144 (2011).
31. See Cheng-Yun Tsang, The Seven Deadly Sins of the Contemporary Financial
System, 37 REV. BANKING&FIN. L. 359, 368 (2017); Kathryn Judge, Interbank Discipline, 60
UCLAL. REV. 1262, 1306–07 (2013).
32. Douglas Elliot, Systemic Risk and the Asset Management Industry, ECONOMIC
STUDIES AT BROOKINGS (May 2014), 4, available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content
/uploads/2016/06/systemic_risk_asset_management_elliott.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4H5-T7
YA].
33. See Alexander Mehra, Legal Authority in Unusual and Exigent Circumstances: The
Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 221, 262 (2010) (identifying
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material factor in the banking panic of 1907, when what first appeared to be
a “contained” crisis (limited to a few firms), quickly spread to traditional
banks, and the larger economy as a result of “extensive interconnections.”34
Researchers from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have also
described the role of interconnectedness in the Herstatt Bank crisis in 1974,
and the failure of Long Term Capital Management in 1998.35
There are several economic benefits to interconnectedness, including
liquidity, risk diffusion, maturity transformation, and efficient capital
intermediation from savers to borrowers;36 yet the operations of highly
interconnected firms in a crisis can also contribute to panicked selling, and
contagion to other asset classes.37 Yellen notes that complex
interconnections can “serve to amplify existing market frictions, information
asymmetries, or other externalities.”38 In support of this proposition,
empirical research has shown that a high degree of interconnectedness can
increase market fragility as instabilities, or panicked sell-offs, in one sector
quickly spread to others in a contagion.39
iii. Interconnectedness as a Material Factor in the 2008 Global
Financial Crisis
The GFC proved that instabilities at widely “interconnected” financial
institutions could rapidly transmit shocks throughout the entire economy40
and impact the entire “financial system.”41 When Lehman Brothers failed, a
“shock was transmitted through money market mutual funds to the short-
term funding and interbank markets.”42 It also froze the derivatives markets
as Lehman was thought to be counterparty to $5 trillion in credit default swap
(CDS) contracts, causing “gridlock” in money market and fixed income
the “chain reaction problem” inherent in systemic risk); see also Daniel J. Hunt, Just Grin
and Bear It: Why Consistent Use of Individual Bailouts Under Section 13(3) of the Federal
Reserve Act Is a Necessary Evil to Combat Economic ‘Mass Destruction’, 6 GEO. MASON J.
INT’LCOM. L. 59, 60 (2014).
34. See Yellen, supra note 21.
35. Jorge A. Chan-Lau, Regulatory Capital Charges for Too-Connected to Fail
Institutions 3 (IMF,Working PaperWP/10/98), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/201
0/wp1098.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KGR-BHBW].
36. See Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Financial Contagion, 108(1) J. OF POL’Y ECON.
1,4 (2000).
37. Yellen, supra note 21.
38. Id.
39. See Allen & Gale, supra note 36, at 4.
40. EUROPEANCENTRALBANK, supra note 26, at 6.
41. See Schwarcz, supra note 27, at 35.
42. Yellen, supra note 21.
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trading as banks “hoarded liquidity.”43 Similarly, the asset-backed
commercial paper market (ABCP) experienced interconnected material
distress when “investors reali[z]ed that money market mutual funds had
invested in paper backed by sub-prime assets.”44 When ABCP failed,
investors soon became “distrustful of all forms of private credit,” leading to
a near instantaneous withdrawal of liquidity in wholesale funding markets
because of complex network linkages of financial institutions.45 Similarly,
in money market funds, when the Reserve Primary Fund “broke the buck” a
wave of redemptions “fueled instability in the credit markets.”46
The GFC also showed the speed at which healthy but highly
interconnected institutions can fail.47 During the crisis, “interconnected
nonbank institutions” took many risks under lowered regulatory
parameters.48 Bear Sterns was deemed too great of a systemic risk because
of its interconnectedness to let fail (leading to a bail-out).49 Yet Bear was
smaller than Lehman Brothers (which was allowed to fail).50 Alan Blinder
has suggested that “[t]he primary reason [the Fed saved Bear] was fear that
Bear was too interconnected to fail.”51 The potential shock transmission
from the failure of a highly interconnected AIG made its bail-out a
necessity.52
43. See Andrew G. Haldane, Rethinking the Financial Network, Speech at Financial
Student Association, Amsterdam (April 28, 2009), available at https://www.bis.org/review/r0
90505e.pdf [https://perma.cc/SKJ3-8WD3].
44. EUROPEAN CENTRALBANK, supra note 26, at 5.
45. Id.
46. Id.; see Daniel Schwarcz & David Zaring, Regulation By Threat: Dodd Frank and
The Nonbank Problem, 84 UNI. OF CHICAGO L. REV. 1813, 1828 (2017).
47. See CENTER FORAMERICAN PROGRESS, supra note 23.
48. SeeLetter from Timothy Geithner, Former Sec’y of the Treasury, Jacob Lew, Former
Sec’y of the Treasury, Ben Bernanke Former Chair of the Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys. & Janet Yellen, Former Chair of the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
to Steven T. Mnuchin, Sec’y of the Treasury, & Jerome H. Powell, Chair of the Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (May 13, 2019), (on file at https://int.nyt.com/data/docum
enthelper/887-bernanke-geithner-lew-yellen-letter/a22621b202dfcb0fe06e/optimized/full.pd
f [https://perma.cc/DP6R-FYJZ].).
49. See HENRYM.PAULSON JR. ON THEBRINK: INSIDETHERACETO STOPTHECOLLAPSE
OF THEGLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM, at 117 (2010); see also Hunt, supra note 33, at 72–73.
50. Macey & Holdcroft, supra note 22, at 138.
51. ALANS.BLINDER, AFTER THEMUSICSTOPPED: THEFINANCIALCRISIS, THERESPONSE,
AND THEWORKAHEAD, at 112–13 (2013).
52. EUROPEAN CENTRALBANK, supra note 26, at 7.
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generates “interdependencies” amongst “institutions, sectors and systems.”85
The notion of financial market interdependencies as a source of
interconnection-based systemic risk has been documented in research by the
DTCC.86 The “complex web of direct and indirect links” in the U.S. financial
system was also a material factor in the GFC that linked numerous market
participants.87 The spread of contagion in a market panic is dependent on a
variety of links and interdependencies.88 As subsequent sections in this
article will highlight, numerous direct and indirect links are being fostered
by large ETF sponsors.89 A centrally connected financial institution will act
as a “hub” with a large number of “links” (generally contractual) with
counterparties comprising a large number of “interdependencies.”90
III. HOWDO ETFS FACILITATECOMPLEX ECONOMIC
INTERCONNECTIONS?
i. Post-Crisis Passive Investing and the Rise of ETF “Mega” Firms
The popularity of ETFs have surged post-GFC.91 They are now an
increasingly important component of the modern investment ecosystem.92
The ETF market has “swelled” in excess of $4 trillion since the late nineties,
and in the process, led to ETF issuer consolidation and the emergence of a
few ETF “mega” firms.93 Smaller sponsors have been “squeezed out” as the
large players compete for valuable assets under management (AUM),94
which are an independent source of revenue from securities lending.95
Recent Morningstar data reveals that BlackRock (who issues iShares ETFs)
is the largest U.S. and global market issuer, followed closely by Vanguard
85. EUROPEAN CENTRALBANK, supra note 26, at 16.
86. See DTCC Whitepaper, supra note 55, at 14.
87. DTCC Whitepaper, supra note 55, at 3.
88. See Allen & Gale, supra note 36.
89. See infra Section III(iv).
90. EUROPEAN CENTRALBANK, supra note 26, at 16, 18.
91. See Bryan Borzykowski, The Trillion-Dollar ETF Boom Triggered by the Financial
Crisis Just Keeps Getting Bigger, CNBC (Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/14
/the-trillion-dollar-etf-boom-triggered-by-the-financial-crisis.html [https://perma.cc/78NG-Z
7Z5].
92. See Su, supra note 5.
93. Michael Wursthorn, The $4 Trillion ETF Industry is Creating More ‘Roadkill’ THE
WALL STREET JOURNAL (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-4-trillion-etf-indus
try-is-creating-more-roadkill-11572255004 [https://perma.cc/8NW9-ENS3].
94. Id.
95. See infra Section III(iii)(g).
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(one of the pioneers of the industry).96 State Street is next in line, followed
by Invesco, Schwab and First Trust.97 The lion’s share of the ETF market
(studies suggest over 83%) is managed, however, by the top three:
BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street.98 These ETF firms are a continuing
focal point for systemic risk “watchdogs.”99 Prominent market participants
have also started to question the seemingly “endless creation” of ETF
products.100
ii. Estimated Growth Projections of the Most Dominant ETF Firms
The size of BlackRock is particularly striking, with AUM nearing $7
trillion and a footprint in over 100 countries.101 It’s effectively become the
“biggest investment management company across the globe.”102 As the ETF
market grows, the ETF sponsor space is becoming increasingly concentrated,
with new money disproportionately flowing into the largest fund
structures.103 A recent study by Professors Lucian Bebchuck and Scott Hirst
projects that within two decades, the three asset management firms with the
largest ETF market share (BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street Global
Advisors) could collectively double market power, and in turn exert control
over 40 percent of the voting shares of all the companies in the S&P 500.104
Bebchuk and Hirst add that the voting power of these firms is “even greater
than would be suggested by the proportion of shares that they manage
because many other shareholders do not vote.”105 Given current trends, they
suggest that these firms will “dominate” voting of public companies in the
96. See Wursthorn, supra note 93.
97. Wursthorn, supra note 93.
98. See Su, supra note 5, at 16.
99. See Siobhan Riding, Watchdogs Probe Systemic Risks of Passive Fund Growth,
FINANCIALTIMES (Mar. 31, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/a1deabc2-3eab-11e9-9499-29
0979c9807a [https://perma.cc/VFE2-S44U].
100. See Jim Cramer, We Need to Bring Back Individual Investors, REAL MONEY (Apr.
23, 2019), https://realmoney.thestreet.com/investing/stocks/jim-cramer-we-need-to-bring-ba
ck-individual-investors-14933853 [https://perma.cc/A584-H3NZ].
101. Trevis Team, BlackRock’s Revenue Growth Will Slow Down Considerably Over
Coming Years, FORBES (Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/201
9/09/18/blackrocks-revenue-growth-will-slow-down-considerably-over-coming-years/#2303
728d7d79 [https://perma.cc/SNN6-D6FH].
102. Greg McFarlane, How BlackRock Makes Money, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 24, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/markets/012616/how-blackrock-makes-money.asp [h
ttps://perma.cc/48Z2-72V6].
103. See Wursthorn, supra note 93.
104. See Bebchuck & Hirst, supra note 6, at 741.
105. See Bebchuck & Hirst, supra note 6, at 738.
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banking and securities lending.195 The Financial Stability Board (FSB)196
has identified ten “non-bank financial entities involved in shadow banking”
post GFC in the Americas, including ETF firms.197 Nonbank lending played
a key role in the GFC,198 particularly by AIG,199 and the FSOC’s non-bank
SIFI declaratory power (which will be discussed in detail below) safeguards
against this risk.200 Recent research shows that securities lending by ETF
issuers in the U.S. has increased to levels unprecedented since the GFC.201
Many ETF issuers engage in securities lending.202 An ETF sponsor can
profit by lending a fund’s underlying securities to market participants like
short-sellers.203 Elon Musk, among others, has been vocal against ETF
issuers by stating that they stimulate short selling through securities lending,
and that ETF investors don’t realize the extent of these practices.204
195. See THE ECONOMIST, How Shadow Banking Works (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.econ
omist.com/the-economist-explains/2016/02/01/how-shadow-banking-works [https://perma.c
c/X6UB-HGVT] (describing the definition of the term “shadow banking” and how asset
managers are engaged in this industry. “[T]he term is used more loosely to cover all financial
intermediaries that perform bank-like activity but are not regulated as one. These include
mobile payment systems, pawnshops, peer-to-peer lending websites, hedge funds and bond-
trading platforms set up by technology firms. Among the biggest are asset management
companies. In 2013 investment funds that make such loans raised a whopping $97 billion
worldwide.”).
196. The Financial Stability Board (FSB) is an “international body that monitors and
makes recommendations about the global financial system” established after the G20 London
2009 summit. FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, About the FSB, https://www.fsb.org/about/ [htt
ps://perma.cc/QTK7-AGDZ] (last visited Nov. 4, 2019).
197. FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD REGIONAL CONSULTATIVEGROUP FOR THEAMERICAS,
Report on Shadow Banking in the Americas, 5 (Aug. 22, 2014), https://www.fsb.org/wp-
content/uploads/r_140822b.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4R8-DZM4].
198. Cox, supra note 148.
199. Schwarcz & Zaring, supra note 46, at 1827; McDonald & Paulson, supra note 150,
at 82–95.
200. CENTER FORAMERICAN PROGRESS, supra note 23.
201. Tim McLaughlin & Ross Kerber, Securities Lending Boom Sparks Concerns on
Returns and Voting, REUTERS (Nov. 7, 2018, 1:06 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
funds-lending-analysis/securities-lending-boom-sparks-concerns-on-returns-and-voting-idU
SKCN1ND0JA [https://perma.cc/E9AK-H29P]; Jessica Tasman-Jones, SJP Securities
Lending More Than Doubles at Blackrock, PORTFOLIOADVISER (Aug. 14, 2019), https://port
folio-adviser.com/sjp-securities-lending-more-than-doubles-at-blackrock/
[https://perma.cc/RVE9-VR5V].
202. Braham, supra note 152.
203. Braham, supra note 152.
204. Katerina Petroff & Annie Massa, Musk Says BlackRock Makes ‘Excessive Profit’
from Short Lending, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2018-10-05/musk-says-blackrock-makes-excessive-profit-from-short-lending [https://perma.
cc/YMF8-PZH2].
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(MMMFs), which have more significant regulation post-GFC.212
Prior to the GFC, MMMFs were viewed as cash substitutes that paid
higher rates than bank deposits;213 however, primeMMMFs created systemic
risk by investing heavily in commercial paper (CP) backed by subprime
mortgage loans and other illiquid and largely opaque asset classes.214 On
September 16, 2008 the Reserve Primary Fund (RPF) (the oldest MMMF in
the U.S.) announced that it was “breaking the buck” and reducing its net asset
value to below $1 per share because of exposure to $785 million of Lehman
Brother’s CP, a move that precipitated a run on both the RPF and other
MMMFs.215 The resulting market panic led to an immediate $85 billion loan
to AIG (to prevent another major institution from failing),216 and the Fed
providing nonrecourse discount window bank loans to purchase the toxic-
asset backed CP from the MMMFs (a program that peaked at $150 billion
exposure).217 In October 2008 the Fed and the Treasury provided additional
support mechanisms for MMMFs, the CP market at large, and the “shadow
banking” system.218
ETF mega firms issue cash and MMMF substitutes, like BlackRock’s
iShares Short Term Treasury Bond ETF.219 Also, the ETF market has
212. See Chris Dieterich, ETFs as a Solution for Cash, BARRON’S (Mar. 6, 2015),
https://www.barrons.com/articles/etfs-as-a-solution-to-cash-1425697664 [https://perma.cc/2
74H-YJFR] (explaining the apparent liquidity of ETFs that makes them attractive substitutes
for cash and other short-term funds).
213. See TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, STRESS TEST: REFLECTIONS ON FINANCIAL CRISES, (New
York: Broadway Books, 2014); 195–96, (stating that “[m]oney market funds were widely
viewed as virtually indistinguishable from bank deposits as similarly safe vehicles for storing
cash with slightly better interest rates”).
214. Id. at 127–28; Martin Kacperczyk & Philipp Schnabl, When Safe Proved Risky:
Commercial Paper during the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, 24(1) J.OFECON. PERSPECTIVES
29, 34–37 (2010).
215. Phillip Swagel, Legal, Political, and Institutional Constraints on the Financial Crisis
Policy Response, 29(2) J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 107, 112–13 (2015); See also Phillip
Swagel, The Financial Crisis: An Inside View, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
(Spring 2009), 40–41; PAULSON, supra note 49, at 233–34 (New York: Business Plus, 2010)
216. PAULSON, supra note 49, at 233–41; Geithner, supra note 213, at 194–97; McDonald
& Paulson, supra note 150, at 89.
217. BLINDER, supra note 51, at 147–48 (New York: Penguin Group (USA), LLC, 2013);
Lorie Logan, William Nelson & Patrick Parkinson, Novel Lender of Last Resort Programs
(Sept. 2018), 9–11, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/02-Novel-
LOLR-Prelim-Disc-Draft-2018.09.11.pdf [https://perma.cc/EJ9N-339D].
218. Zoltan Pozsar, Tobias Adrian, AdamAshcraft, and Hayley Boesky, Shadow Banking,
FEDERALRESERVEBANKOFNEWYORKSTAFFREPORTNO. 458 (July 2010) at 61–64, http://ssr
n.com/abstract=1645337 [https://perma.cc/8AB9-35K5]; MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY
PROBLEM: RETHINKING FINANCIAL REGULATION (CHICAGO: UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS,
2016), 96–101.
219. ISHARES, iShares Short Term Treasury Bond ETF, https://www.ishares.com/us/prod
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actively “rebalance,” adjust allocations, and seek outperformance.226 Yet
another (more subtle, but potentially destructive) form of ETF moral hazard
may exist in the relationship between debt underwriters and ETF issuers. For
example, the ESRB Report notes:
[t]he passive nature of ETFs in that they constitute investments in
fixed-income products may in principle create a moral hazard
problem in the issuance of such products: anticipating that they
will be bought by ETFs, bond underwriters may forgo due
diligence on such instruments, as was the case in the originate-to-
distribute business model before the global financial crisis.227
The firms that “devise” the underlying index can also have conflicts228
including threats from China to include their companies in basket
compositions.229 The indexes themselves are susceptible to manipulation,
which could hurt investors.230 ETFs can also incentivize risky behavior in
other financial institutions. Some ETFs invest in leveraged loans,231 and
numerous ETF companies have recently signalled their intention to enter this
market as well.232 Knowing that there is a market for leveraged loans, driven
226. Id.
227. ESRB Report, supra note 130, at 4 n.2; See also A. Purnanandam, Originate-to-
Distribute Model and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 24(6) REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
1881-1915 (2011) (discussing the originate to distribute model in the global financial crisis
and the resulting moral hazard).
228. See Robert J. Jackson & Steven Davidoff Solomon, What’s Really in Your Index
Fund? N.Y.TIMES (Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/18/opinion/index-fun
d.html [https://perma.cc/W6ZH-ZQQ8].
229. See Mike Bird, How China Pressured MSCI to Add Its Market to Major Benchmark,
THEWALL STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 3, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-china-pressur
ed-msci-to-add-its-market-to-major-benchmark-11549195201 [https://perma.cc/368N-ZH9
S] (detailing the interaction between index funds, the Chinese government, and the market in
China).
230. See Mark DeCambre, How Trillion-dollar Stock-market Index Funds Are Vulnerable
to Manipulation that ‘Could Harm American Investors,’ MARKETWATCH (Feb. 20, 2019),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-trillion-dollar-stock-market-index-funds-are-vulne
rable-to-manipulation-that-could-harm-american-investors-2019-02-19 [https://perma.cc/PG
A4-MXYC] (pointing out that the methods used to create index funds are not necessarily
aligned with fund value maximization).
231. SeeMayra Rodriguez Valladares, Big Banks Are Very Exposed to Leveraged Lending
and CLO Markets, FORBES (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mayrarodri
guezvalladares/2019/04/15/big-banks-are-very-exposed-to-leveraged-lending-and-clo-
markets/#38dd21987309 [https://perma.cc/DG3J-LKY7] (demonstrating the growth of
leveraged lending and pondering the implications for systemic risk).
232. See Mayra Rodriguez Valladares, The SEC Tells Senator Elizabeth Warren That It Is
Monitoring CLO Markets, FORBES (May 6, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mayrarodrig
uezvalladares/2019/05/06/the-sec-tells-senator-elizabeth-warren-that-it-is-monitoring-clo-m
arkets/#7a52a2be2124 [https://perma.cc/TGF9-C33C] (identifying the growth in the
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contagion selling in underlying assets, especially for ETFs with illiquid
assets (like bonds).240 There is also a “herding” potential that gets
exacerbated through ETF duplication as firms look to copy other’s index
structures.241 The quick creation of new products could generate buying
pressures by consumers not well suited to hold such risk exposure (like ETFs
that replicate complex trading strategies used by hedge funds).242 In a crisis,
once risks materialize, investors could quickly sell their ETFs.243 Another
potential scenario is a “run” on a big asset manager (like BlackRock) where
all secondary market fund holders simultaneously liquidate their holdings.244
There is also an emerging, and unsettled, debate on the price distortive and
volatility enhancing impact of ETFs on underlying securities.245
Mutual funds holders can interact directly with a mutual fund issuer and
redeem their fund units at NAV246 because of Investment Company Act
provisions governing open-end management investment companies.247
Likewise, MMMFs are generally redeemable at a “stable” NAV ($1.00 per
share); however, post-crisis rules designed to mitigate MMMF runs have
adjusted these rules somewhat by introducing a “floating NAV” provision to
account for underlying securities daily prices (rather than a $1.00 “stable
share price”) on MMMFs that invest in corporate debt.248
ETF investors can’t transact directly with the fund sponsor to redeem
their shares at the underlying NAV.249 They must sell them into the
240. Id. at 10–11.
241. Id. at 9.
242. Jeff Reeves, 7 ETFs That Act Like a Hedge Fund,U.S.NEWS&WORLDREPORT (July
18, 2018), https://money.usnews.com/investing/funds/slideshows/7-etfs-that-act-like-a-hedg
e-fund [https://perma.cc/JN87-4JV4].
243. OFR Report, supra note 239, at 11–12.
244. Dellinger, supra note 4.
245. Compare ESRBReport, supra note 130withKenechukwuAnadu, Mathias S. Kruttli,
Patrick E. McCabe, Emilio Osambela, & Chaehee Shin, The Shift From Active to Passive
Investing: Potential Risks to Financial Stability? (Sept. 17, 2019), (unpublished manuscript)
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3244467 [https://perma.cc/Y9NZ-GLYV].
246. John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment Fund
Structure and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228 (2013).
247. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(32), 5(a)(1) (2012); INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE,
Frequently Asked Questions About Mutual Fund Share Pricing, https://www.ici.org/faqs/faq/
mfs/faqs_navs [https://perma.cc/EL8G-PBGJ].
248. See Kuhu Parasrampuria, SEC’s New Money Market Rules, 36 REV. BANKING&FIN.
L. 2, 2–3 (2016) (noting that in addition to the “floating NAV” the reforms “also impose fees
and redemption gates, which temporarily prohibit investors from withdrawing their
investments in MMFs”).
249. See FIDELITY, Understanding How Mutual Funds, ETFs and Stocks Trade, FIDELITY
LEARNINGCENTER, https://www.fidelity.com/learning-center/trading-investing/trading/tradin
g-differences-mutual-funds-stocks-etfs [https://perma.cc/NL56-2VLH] (last visited Nov. 4,
2019) (explaining the structure of funds trading).
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secondary market (and find a willing counterparty), so in a panic they could
be “trampled by the herd.”250 The ETF redemption process is only available
to a small number of “designated” authorized participants or “APs,” who
redeem ETF shares in “large blocks” and are incentivized through an
arbitrage mechanism to eliminate price differences in the ETF secondary
market and the underlying NAV.251 Even though only APs can redeemETFs,
there are still concerns that in a crisis or run on an ETF issuer, it won’t be
able to satisfy AP redemption requests.252
Individual firms within the ETF operating ecosystem may be an
independent source of risk since high levels of concentration in the industry
can induce both operational and fire sale risk.253 The failure of a large ETF
firm, or AP, could “amplify or transmit risks to other parts of the financial
system.”254 In a “stressed market,” an ETF sponsor could face many
redemption requests from APs,255 or an AP withdraw, if the value of the
secondary market ETFs deviated significantly from the value of the
underlying fund assets.256 AP redemption en mass could also spread selling
pressure to the underlying assets themselves,257 and then back to the ETF
secondary market in what’s been described as a fire sale “feedback loop.”258
250. See Paul Amery, Will Investors Be Trampled by the Herd? FINANCIAL TIMES (Sept.
11, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/be19405a-652c-11e6-8310-ecf0bddad227 [https://per
ma.cc/JPF9-DB76] (outlining the risks associated with herd behaviour when trading ETF
funds).
251. See Hu & Morley, A Regulatory Framework, supra note 168, at 873 (explaining the
regulation around structured arbitrage in ETF trading).
252. Amery, supra note 250.
253. See OFR Report, supra note 239, at 3.
254. OFR Report, supra note 239, at 18.
255. OFR Report, supra note 239, at 12.
256. See Natasha Doff, Hedge Fund Manager Stakes Own Cash on a Bet Against Credit
ETFs, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-
05/hedge-fund-manager-stakes-own-cash-betting-credit-etfs-crumble [https://perma.cc/3YL
B-WVAQ].
257. See Ian Foucher & Kyle Gray, Exchange-Traded Funds: Evolution of Benefits,
Vulnerabilities and Risks, BANK OF CANADA FINANCIAL SYSTEM REVIEW (Dec. 2014) at 42
(“APs can also transmit liquidity shocks from the ETF to the underlying assets (and vice
versa). As ETFs and the underlying market become more interconnected, a small liquidity
shock originating in either the ETF or the underlying securities could be amplified through a
feedback loop (via APs). This could result in a large liquidity shock and a reduction in price
informativeness for both the ETF and the underlying market.”).
258. Id.
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Asset managers, even as financial agents, can “create or amplify systemic
risk” if they generate a “procyclical” impact on the financial cycle and induce
contagion across other financial sectors.281 The IMF, in its April 2019Global
Financial Stability Report, noted that ETFs may be driving liquidity
“mismatch” and increasing the “likelihood of herding,” both impacting
liquidity demand.282 They also may be attracting short term volatility traders.
For example, in 2013 when the Federal Reserve proposed ending its
quantitative easing program, short term traders aggressively sold fixed
income ETFs, impacting the yield spreads of the underlying bonds.283 Also,
in the “flash crash” of 2010, ETF prices diverged significantly from their
NAV.284
Professors Henry Hu and John Morley describe the starting point for
ETF generated systemic risk as an impairment of the “expectations of easy
exit.”285 Since many participants, who are relied on to support the ETF
trading ecosystem (such as APs and market making firms), are driven by
their own independent profit-seeking motives, it is uncertain whether they
can be relied on to provide a “backstop” against panicked selling in a crisis.286
APs may halt the process of redeeming or creating ETFs, leading the ETFs
themselves to trade as closed-end funds, and their secondary market price
deviating from the NAV, with HFT and other market makers either widening
their bid-ask spreads or leaving the market.287 Investors could also look to
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-06-12/scarce-liquidity-is-a-growing-risk
[https://perma.cc/H79Q-6JKJ].
281. Claude Lopez, The Asset Management Industry, Systemic Risk, and Macroprudential
Policy, THECAPCO INSTITUTE JOURNALOFFINANCIALTRANSFORMATION121 (2018), available
at https://milkeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/reports-pdf/SSRN-id2953076.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/NQ4C-MUVL].
282. See International Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability Report: Vulnerabilities
in a Maturing Credit Cycle (Apr. 2019), at 50, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/GFSR/Is
sues/2019/03/27/Global-Financial-Stability-Report-April-2019 [https://perma.cc/5HAW-P9
7G]; see also Steve Johnson, IMFWarns on Risk of Rapid Exits from EmergingMarket Assets,
FINANCIAL TIMES (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/12303ac0-5ad7-11e9-939a-
341f5ada9d40 [https://perma.cc/9BPD-R2CT].
283. See SEC Subcommittee Report, supra note 119 at 23–24; C. Dannhauser, & S.
Hoseinzade, The Transformation of Corporate Bondinvestors and Fragility: Evidence on
Mutual Funds and ETFs, WORKING PAPER, VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY (2018), available at https
://www.mtsu.edu/econfin/CaitlinDUpdated.pdf [https://perma.cc/PV2U-W6K3].
284. See SEC Subcommittee Report, supra note 119, at 24–25.
285. See Hu & Morley, A Regulatory Framework, supra note 168, at 843.
286. See Allen Elstein, Too Big to Curtail? Index Funds and ETFs Pose Hidden Risks for
Unwary Investors, CONTINGENCIES, AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ACTUARIES (May / June 2018),
http://contingencies.org/too-big-to-curtail-index-funds-and-etfs-pose-hidden-risks-for-unwa
ry-investors/ [https://perma.cc/HNZ2-3W2Y].
287. See Mike Bird, Could ETFs Fall into A Liquidity Jam? THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
(Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/return-of-volatility-raises-liquidity-question-f
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pre-empt AP departure by shorting ETFs.288
ETFs are an attractive mechanism for “pessimistic” short sellers to
“speculate or hedge.”289 ETF short sellers can add to pro-cyclical selling in
a crisis,290 and empirical evidence suggests that “difficult to mimic
underlying indexes” are more commonly the target of shorts with physical
and synthetic ETFs having “equal changes to be sold short.”291 Also, ETFs
allow for the construction of “synthetic short[s]” of illiquid individual index
component securities (for example by shorting an ETF and then buying long
only some parts of the index),292 and this could also exacerbate fire-sell
pressures on certain stocks in a crisis. Disappearing intermediaries can also
affect liquidity in underlying asset classes, which can exacerbate sell-offs
and lead to contagion.293 Some worry that liquidity shortages in ETFs could
generate sell-offs in other asset classes, including peer firm ETFs, as
investors who can’t sell their ETF shares (or can only sell them at steep
discounts) will move quickly to liquidate other investments.294 This could
also create a “feedback loop” as coordinated selling drives prices downward
in both the ETF secondary and underlying asset markets.295 This is
particularly relevant for the growing segment of institutional investors that
or-etfs-1521627574?mod=ITP_businessandfinance_0&tesla=y [https://perma.cc/YZE3-KF
ZB]; see FINANCIALSTABILITYOVERSIGHTCOUNCIL,Update on Review of Asset Management
Products and Activities (Nov. 16, 2016) available at, https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives
/fsoc/news/Documents/FSOC%20Update%20on%20Review%20of%20Asset%20Managem
ent%20Products%20and%20Activities.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GKB-52VT].
288. Joanna Ossinger, JPMorgan Says ETFs Won’t Be the Biggest Victims if Credit Blows
Up, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 9, 2018, 10:40 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201
8-11-09/jpmorgan-says-etfs-won-t-bebiggest-victims-if-credit-blows-up [https://perma.cc/Q
98E-RD93].
289. See Oleg Deev & Dagmar Linnertova, The Determinants of ETFs Short Selling
Activity, 109 PROCEDIA – SOCIAL ANDBEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 669, 669 (2014), https://www.s
ciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1877042813051653 [https://perma.cc/97H9-UHKK].
290. See Božena Chovancová, Michaela Dorocáková & Dagmar Linnertová, Two
Investment Options for Bearish ETF Investors: Inverse ETF and Shorting ETF, 7(31) INT. J.
FINANCIAL STUD. 2019 at 13.
291. See Deev & Linnertova, supra note 289, at 673.
292. See Crystal Kim, Synthetic Shorting With ETFs, BARRON’S (Febr. 27, 2017),
https://www.barrons.com/articles/synthetic-shorting-with-etfs-1488206009 [https://perma.cc
/F6UJ-52ZS].
293. Elstein, supra note 286.
294. Elstein, supra note 286.
295. See Foucher & Gray, supra note 257, at 42 (“APs can also transmit liquidity shocks
from the ETF to the underlying assets (and vice versa). As ETFs and the underlying market
become more interconnected, a small liquidity shock originating in either the ETF or the
underlying securities could be amplified through a feedback loop (via APs). This could result
in a large liquidity shock and a reduction in price informativeness for both the ETF and the
underlying market.”).
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of APs who could remedy liquidity shortages, since liquidity is often
“fragile” during a crisis.304 Further, HFT and other liquidity providers may
“pause” in a stress event and withdraw from the market if the arbitrage
mechanism leads to a decoupling of the ETF price and its NAV.305
In a report released before the coronavirus market crash, the UK’s
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) modestly rebutted contentions of fixed-
income ETFs as a “threat to financial stability” due to liquidity
mismatches,306 citing the “resilience” of discretionary liquidity providers
during periods of post-crisis market stress.307 They acknowledge, however,
emerging risks in the sector, including “highly concentrated” markets for
liquidity providers308 and authorized participants.309 Further, the FCA
qualifies its support for discretionary liquidity providers as “preliminary”
with “tentative evidence” during times of stress and acknowledges the need
for more research.310 Others have countered that a true crisis, or market
selloff, hasn’t happened since 2008, and ETFs as a nascent but quickly
growing asset class haven’t been truly tested.311 Additionally, the IMF in its
April 2019 Global Financial Stability Report, highlights the growing risks
Risks of Passive Fund Growth, FINANCIALTIMES (Mar. 31, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content
/a1deabc2-3eab-11e9-9499-290979c9807a [https://perma.cc/2SED-RPZN].
304. For an analogous application from the GFC that shows how liquidity is “fragile”
during a crisis, see Song Han & Dan Li, The Fragility of Discretionary Liquidity Provision:
Lessons From the Collapse of the Auction Rate Securities Market, FINANCE AND ECONOMICS
DISCUSSION SERIESDIVISIONS OFRESEARCH&STATISTICS ANDMONETARYAFFAIRS, FEDERAL
RESERVEBOARD (May 2010), available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/20
1050/201050pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/99XK-77PY].
305. See Su, supra note 5, at 17 (illustrating how market makers “paused” their activity in
ETFs during the May 2010 flash crash).
306. SeeHuw Jones, ETFs Pose No Threat to Financial Stability – UKMarkets Watchdog,
REUTERS (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-regulator-etf/etfs-pose-
no-threat-to-financial-stability-uk-markets-watchdog-idUSKCN1UY19O [https://perma.cc/
AC2L-SK6V].
307. Matteo Aquilina, Karen Croxson, Gian Giacomo Valentini & Lachlan Vass, Fixed
Income ETFs: Primary Market Participation and Resilience of Liquidity During Periods of
Stress, FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, RESEARCH Note (Aug. 2019), available at
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/fixed-income-etfs-primary-market-participatio
n-resilience-liquidity-during-periods-stress.pdf [https://perma.cc/D45Q-V7T7].
308. Id. at 4 (“There is a high level of concentration among APs. The 5 most active APs
are responsible for about 75% of overall reported primary market volumes (across all asset
classes). Concentration is particularly pronounced in the fixed income market, with the top 5
APs there accounting for around 91% of overall volumes and the top AP itself accounting for
51%”).
309. Id. at 4.
310. Id. at 13.
311. See DB Report, supra note 175, at 79.
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BlackRock’s iShares Core UK Gilts, an ETF tracking Sterling denominated
UK government bonds,319 “has about two-thirds of the fund on loan at any
one time and accepts equities and other ETFs as collateral.”320 Post GFC
rules in the U.S. require loans to be “overcollateralized” (102 percent for
U.S. securities and 105 percent for international) and also limit the amount
of a fund’s underlying assets that can be lent out to one-third of the fund
assets.321
An ETF firm will also invest cash collateral.322 U.S. rules curtail the
level of risk that an ETF firm can take on with their cash collateral
investments,323 yet a debtor could quickly return the borrowed securities and
demand their cash collateral, forcing the lender to liquidate their investments
at a loss.324 This problem gets “exacerbated” if the invested securities have
decreased in value themselves, or are experiencing liquidity shortages.325
ETF securities lenders also expose their investors to counter-party risk (with
greater exposure for synthetic ETFs).326 Borrowers in a securities lending
transaction with an ETF firm could fail in a crisis, and the borrowed
securities could be difficult to recover.327 ETF firms also contract with
independent “lending agents” to facilitate securities lending transactions, and
they could be materially affected if one of these lending agents experiences
significant distress in a crisis. 328
Correspondingly, if a large ETF firm experienced material financial
distress or failure and defaulted on its contractual obligations, negative
pressure would be put on contractual counterparties, which could trigger a
“chain-reaction” of negative events.329 This impairs financial stability if
319. See iShares Core UK Gilts UCITS ETF, https://www.ishares.com/uk/individual/en/p
roducts/251806/ishares-uk-gilts-ucits-etf?switchLocale=y&siteEntryPassthrough=true [https
://perma.cc/7BN8-V5Q9] (last visited Nov. 9, 2019).
320. Mooney, supra note 209.
321. See Adam McCullough, Examining the Risks and Rewards of Securities Lending,
MORNINGSTAR (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.morningstar.com/articles/904334/examining-
the-risks-and-rewards-of-securities-lending [https://perma.cc/77SM-L6T6].
322. Mooney, supra note 209.
323. See McCullough, supra note 321.
324. See Tepe, supra note 316, at 863.
325. Tepe, supra note 316, at 863–64.
326. See Christophe Hurlin, Grégoire Iseli, Christophe Perignon, & Stanley Yeung, The
Counterparty Risk Exposure of ETF Investors, HEC PARIS RESEARCH PAPER NO. FIN-2014-
1050 (Mar. 12, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2462747 [https://perma.cc/LKP2-3NQH].
327. See Zoe Van Schyndel, The Risky Business of Securities Lending, THEMOTLEY FOOL
(Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2008/10/16/the-risky-business-of-se
curities-lending.aspx [https://perma.cc/J6EN-5245].
328. See McCullough, supra note 321.
329. See Charles K. Whitehead, Regulating for the Next Financial Crisis, 24 PAC.
MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L. J. 3, 8 (2011) (discussing the transmission of systemic
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canvass the complexity of that question by assessing the challenge in
applying bank-like prudential oversight to ETF firms, the limitations in
applying the FSOC’s proposed “activities-based” rules for non-bank SIFIs372
to ETF issuers, and a variety of other alternative regulatory considerations
and important developments to monitor.
i. Post-Crisis Non-Bank Systemically Important Financial Institution
Designation
FSOC373 was created by The Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (DFA)374 for several aims, including to “identify
risks to the financial stability of the United States that could arise from the
material financial distress or failure, or ongoing activities, of large,
interconnected bank holding companies or nonbank financial companies.”375
The DFA gives FSOC authority to determine whether a “nonbank financial
company’s material financial distress – or the nature, scope, size, scale,
concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of its activities – could pose a
threat to U.S. financial stability.”376 Pursuant to Section 113 of the DFA, the
FSOC can make a “determination” that a nonbank financial company be
subject to Federal Reserve supervision and prudential controls.377 If
designated as a non-bank SIFI, a firm will be “subject to consolidated
supervision and regulation by the Federal Reserve, including risk-based
capital, leverage, liquidity, and risk management requirements.”378 These
standards are more onerous than a standard non-bank’s “baseline regulatory
regime.”379 A variety of “macroprudential tools” are also available to the
372. Financial Stability Oversight Council 12 CFR Part 1310, Vol. 84 No. 49, 9028 (2019)
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/261/Notice-of-Proposed-Interpretive-Guidance.pdf
[https://perma.cc/89D8-MQAB] (hereinafter “FSOC Proposed Rules”).
373. See FINANCIAL STABILITYOVERSIGHTCOUNSEL, About FSOC, https://www.treasury.
gov/initiatives/fsoc/about/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z8UN-79X4] (last visited Jan.
1, 2020) (describing the duties and purpose of FSOC).
374. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 113, 124 Stat. 1376, 1398 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a) (2017)).
375. 12 U.S.C. § 5321 (2012).
376. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL,
Designations, https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Pages/default.aspx [htt
ps://perma.cc/86R8-AXSR] (last visited Oct. 5, 2019) (hereinafter “FSOC Designations”).
377. 12 U.S.C. § 5323 (2012).
378. Jeremy C. Kress, The Last SIFI: The Unwise and Illegal Deregulation of Prudential
Financial, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 171, 172 (2018), https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-con
tent/uploads/sites/3/2018/12/71-Stan.-L.-Rev.-Online-Kress.pdf [https://perma.cc/NYD3-LN
SF]; see also 12 U.S.C. § 5365(b)(1) (2012).
379. Id. at 173.
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Federal Reserve to ensure that the declared non-bank SIFI doesn’t transmit
systemic risk “through the broader economy.”380
In 2013, American International Group, Inc. (AIG), General Electric
Capital Corporation, Inc. (GE), and Prudential Financial, Inc. (Prudential)
were designated non-bank SIFIs,381 and a similar declaration for Metlife, Inc.
(Metlife) followed in 2014.382 In 2016, FSOC de-designated GE after the
firm altered its risk profile and sold off certain assets.383 This was followed
by AIG being de-designated in 2017 after undertaking similar activities.384
Metlife had initially sued FSOC over its status385 and won in district court by
shrinking its insurance business.386 In early 2018, FSOC withdrew its appeal
against Metlife.387 The final institution to shed the label of a non-bank SIFI
was Prudential, which was de-designated in 2018.388
ii. Applying FSOC’s “Activities-Based” Guidance to ETF Firms
Under the revised guidelines, FSOC will only pursue an entity specific
determination under Section 113 of the DFA if “a potential risk or threat
cannot be addressed through an activities based approach.”389 Before
proceeding with a designation, FSOC will also perform a cost-benefit
analysis (CBA) and only proceed if the benefits outweigh the possible
costs.390 It’s highly unlikely the FSOC’s revised framework will capture
380. Kress, McCoy & Schwarcz, supra note 16, at 1474.
381. See FSOC Designations, supra note 376.
382. FSOC Designations, supra note 376.
383. FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, BASIS FOR THE FINANCIAL STABILITY
OVERSIGHT COUNCIL’S RESCISSION OF ITS DETERMINATION REGARDING GE CAPITAL GLOBAL
HOLDINGS, LLC (2016).
384. FINANCIAL STABILITYOVERSIGHTCOUNCIL, NOTICE AND EXPLANATION OF THEBASIS
FOR THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL’S RESCISSION OF ITS DETERMINATION
REGARDINGAMERICAN INTERNATIONALGROUP, INC. (2017).
385. Ryan Tracy, U.S. Judge Questions MetLife ‘Systemically Important’ Designation,
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-judge-
questions-metlife-systemically-important-designation-1455747900 [https://perma.cc/6KB7-
BCKU].
386. Pete Schroeder, MetLife, U.S. Regulators Agree to Set Aside Legal Fight, REUTERS
(Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-metlife-fsoc/metlife-u-s-regulators-
agree-to-set-aside-legal-fight-idUSKBN1F8064 [https://perma.cc/R8C5-GB5M].
387. Kress, supra note 370 at 174; see also Alistair Gray, Trump Administration Drops
Appeal in MetLife ‘Too Big to Fail’ Case, FINANCIAL TIMES (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.ft.c
om/content/cfc31764-ff65-351d-95f2-78e7b413af4f [https://perma.cc/2JPU-ELXH].
388. FINANCIAL STABILITYOVERSIGHTCOUNCIL, NOTICE AND EXPLANATION OF THEBASIS
FOR THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL’S RESCISSION OF ITS DETERMINATION
REGARDING PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL, INC. 2 (2018).
389. FSOC Proposed Rules, supra note 372, at 9028.
390. FSOC Proposed Rules, supra note 372, at 9029.
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asset managers like ETF firms.391 Therefore, despite their size, growth, and
complex interconnectedness, none of the “giant three,”392 even the largest of
all – BlackRock393 – will likely be legally “too big to fail” in the U.S. any
time soon. This is welcomed by BlackRock, who lobbied heavily against
enhanced supervision,394 and Vanguard, who lauded the FSOC’s changes.395
Both firms have battled the “too big to fail” label for most of the decade.396
They strongly rejected previous suggestions by the OFR397 in a 2013 report
that they posed a “too big to fail” systemic risk.398 Also, both firms signal
that the costs of enhanced regulatory scrutiny, due to a non-bank SIFI
designation, would likely flow through to investors in the form of higher
fees.399
iii. Counter Arguments Against Heightened ETF Issuer Regulatory
Scrutiny
BlackRock and Vanguard strongly opposed previous attempts by the
391. See Richard Berner, Kermit Schoenholtz & Lawrence J. White, Lowering The Bar on
Financial Regulation is Fraught With Risk, AMERICAN BANKER (June 27, 2019),
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/lowering-the-bar-on-financial-regulation-is-
fraught-with-risk [https://perma.cc/LCN5-FNL7].
392. Bebchuck & Hirst, supra note 6.
393. See Loomis, supra note 188.
394. CAMPAIGN FOR ACCOUNTABILITY, New Report Details How BlackRock Fought Off
Government Regulation by Spending Big in Washington (Sept. 5, 2019), https://blackrocktran
sparencyproject.org/2019/09/05/new-report-details-how-blackrock-fought-off-government-
regulation-by-spending-big-in-washington/ [https://perma.cc/FKD3-NLPK].
395. See BlackRock Letter to FSOC, supra note 260; VANGUARD, LETTER TO FINANCIAL
STABILITYOVERSIGHTCOUNCIL, RE: AUTHORITY TOREQUIRE SUPERVISION ANDREGULATION
OF CERTAIN NONBANK FINANCIAL COMPANIES; RIN 4030-AA00 (May 13, 2019), https://ww
w.regulations.gov/document?D=FSOC-2019-0001-0013 [https://perma.cc/6ED5-EHWK]
(hereinafter “Vanguard Letter to FSOC”).
396. See Sheila Bair, Is BlackRock Too Big to Fail? FORTUNE (Dec. 4, 2013), https://fort
une.com/2013/12/04/is-blackrock-too-big-to-fail/ [https://perma.cc/5K9L-PX89]; Douglas
Holtz-Eakin & Satya Thallam, What Happens If Investment Funds Are Labeled ‘Too Big to
Fail’? FORBES (June 19,014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/06/19/what-happe
ns-if-investment-funds-are-labeled-too-big-too-fail/#6bc5acede5bb [https://perma.cc/569Y-
82X9].
397. U.S.DEPARTMENTOFTREASURY, OFFICE OFFINANCIALRESEARCH, https://www.finan
cialresearch.gov/ [https://perma.cc/Y73U-HCDE] (last visited Oct. 5, 2019).
398. See also Chris Flood, BlackRock Fights ‘Too Big to Fail’ Fears, FINANCIAL TIMES
(Nov. 4, 2013), https://www.ft.com/content/e79d2280-4553-11e3-b98b-00144feabdc0 [https
://perma.cc/4KYY-68FZ].
399. Douglas Holtz-Eakin & Satya Thallam, What Happens If Investment Funds Are
Labeled ‘Too Big to Fail’? FORBES (June 19, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/20
14/06/19/what-happens-if-investment-funds-are-labeled-too-big-too-fail/#6bc5acede5bb [htt
ps://perma.cc/QM7M-75F4].
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iv. Identifying Potential Value in ETF Mega Sponsor Concentration
There are also several reasons to suggest that market concentration in
asset management benefits consumers. First, because of “economies of
scale,” large ETF issuers can pass on operational efficiencies to investors
(particularly institutional) in the form of lower costs.431 Second, ETFs can
act as “vehicles of price discovery” for underlying assets,432 particularly for
illiquid assets like fixed income and high-yield bond ETFs.433 Others suggest
that ETFs perform a “stabilizing” or economic shock absorbing function in
a crisis or during periods of extreme volatility by “providing direct exposure
to a physical basket of stocks in place of levered derivatives” – evidence of
this phenomenon occurred in the Greek financial crisis of 2015.434
BlackRock in its May 2019 submission to FSOC on the revised activities
based framework for non-bank SIFIs has argued as much, citing how in both
2015 and 2018, ETFs for “high yield” bonds acted as a “shock absorber”
during bouts of heightened volatility.435
v. The Limits of Activities-Based Regulation for Interconnected ETF
Firms
There are concerns that FSOC’s activities-based framework could
decrease financial system stability.436 Given the revised guidance, it seems
unlikely that an asset manager will be legally labeled a non-bank SIFI.437
Former Treasury Secretaries Timothy Geithner and Jacob Lew, along with
former Federal Reserve Chairs Ben Bernanke and Janet Yellen have stated,
in written comments to FSOC, that the proposed changes effectively “neuter
the designation authority.”438 Numerous commentators and academics view
“activity” and “entity” oversight as “complementary” rather than
431. Bebchuck & Hirst, supra note 6, at 729.
432. Novick, supra note 402, at 15.
433. SEC Subcommittee Report, supra note 119; BlackRock, Viewpoint Bond ETFs,
Benefits, Challenges, Opportunities (July 2015), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/litera
ture/whitepaper/viewpoint-bond-etfs-benefits-challenges-opportunities-july-2015.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/U5TD-LH93].
434. Seyffart & Balchunas, supra note 121.
435. BlackRock Letter to FSOC, supra note 260, at 27.
436. BETTER MARKETS, supra note 23.
437. Nellie Liang, A Risky Mix: Looser Financial Regulations When Monetary Policy Is
Easing, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE (Oct. 5, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2019
/10/15/a-risky-mix-looser-financial-regulations-when-monetary-policy-is-easing/ [https://per
ma.cc/NKE3-J69N].
438. Geithner et al., supra note 48.
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prevent systemic risk transmission from non-bank financial companies.473
An activities-based framework is unlikely to address the “combination
of activities” undertaken by one entity.474 An entity-based declaration that
uses prudential measures can at least limit the “cumulative impact” of large,
interconnected firms in a crisis and give the regulator extensive insight into
the risk profile of the entity and its interconnected parts.475 The failure of a
large ETF firm could have significant consequences for the economy, yet
under the revised FSOC guidelines, by the time a non-bank SIFI experiences
material distress it could be “too late.”476 Additionally (and perhaps most
importantly), as noted by the DTCC, one of the most effective ways to
“address interconnectedness risks” is to increase the “resilience of the most
interconnected,”477 and the growth of the mega ETF firms (combined with
the complex interconnectedness factors cited above)478 makes a strong
argument for heightened oversight. As noted by Andrew Haldane, “[i]t is
only when the hub – a large or connected financial institution – is subject to
stress that network dynamics will be properly unearthed.”479
vi. Continuing ETF Risk Monitoring and Alternative Regulatory
Considerations
The FSOC declaratory power for non-bank SIFIs is not a perfect
administrative tool, and it may have several deficiencies from the perspective
of administrative law.480 It does, however, serve as a safeguard for systemic
risks of highly interconnected non-banks. Given the speed at which a crisis
(like the GFC) can crystalize, measures that can help both detect and mitigate
interconnected shock transmission are only “effective” if instituted in
advance of a panic.481 This final subsection will assess other alternative
473. See Kress, McCoy & Schwarcz, supra note 16, at 1489–92 (further discussing the
limitations of an activities-based framework).
474. Geithner et al. supra note 48.
475. Kress, McCoy & Schwarcz, supra note 16, at 1463.
476. See Gregg Gelzinis, Don’t Put SIFI Designations on the Bank Burner, AMERICAN
BANKER (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/dont-put-sifi-designation
s-on-the-back-burner [https://perma.cc/VXP5-AK4E] (emphasizing the need for the FSOC’s
promptness when assessing potential SIFIs).
477. DTCC Whitepaper, supra note 55, at 2.
478. See supra Section III(iv).
479. Haldane, supra note 43, at 6 (noting that this “small world property” has also been
shown to exist in physical networks such as the internet and forest fires).
480. See Robert F. Weber, The FSOC’s Designation Program as a Case Study of the New
Administrative Law of Financial Supervision, 36 YALE J.ONREG. 359 (2019) (discussing such
deficiencies).
481. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION: WHATARE THECOSTS OF LIQUIDITY
TRANSFORMATION?
It’s easy to wonder whether the true costs of ETF liquidity
transformation are under-estimated. ETFs that hold bonds and bespoke loans
create instant liquidity for retail investors to markets that are opaque and
otherwise difficult to access.528 History lends caution when illiquid
underlying assets are synthesized into instantly liquid financial products.529
The idea of transforming something that’s fundamentally “illiquid” (like a
loan) into something “liquid” (an ETF that represents a loan basket) evokes
a liquidity “mismatch” and “illusion” concern (reminiscent of MBS in the
GFC).530 Deposit insurance, and central banks acting as “lenders of last
resort,” curb bank run and systemic risks.531 This “extraordinary”
government support has not been “normally” available to other firms532 and
represents a social “cost” of the intermediation, liquidity and maturity
transformation services that a bank provides.533
The MMMF crisis showed, however, that the government was willing
to support “shadow deposits” in the GFC.534 As a result, the MMMF market
now benefits from an “implicit” guarantee of emergency government
support.535 Like MMMFs, ETFs also offer liquidity transformation by
turning less liquid (often bespoke) loans into cash substitutes.536 In an
528. See Chris Flood, ‘Big Ticket’ Trades Made Possible by Bond ETF Liquidity,
FINANCIAL TIMES (June 17, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/b5e0bb88-5865-11e8-806a-
808d194ffb75 [https://perma.cc/C3HM-MMWX].
529. See Daniel Zwirn, Jim Kyung Soo Liew & Ajakh Ahmad, This Time Is Different, but
It Will End the Same Way: Unrecognized Secular Changes in the Bond Market Since the 2008
Crisis That May Precipitate the Next Crisis (Apr. 29, 2019) (unpublished manuscript),
available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3379979 [https://perma.cc/6U8Q-QN8X].
530. Id. See also Stephen Gandel, There’s a Time Bomb Bigger Than the VIX in the
Market, BLOOMBERGOPINION (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201
8-02-07/there-s-a-time-bomb-bigger-than-the-vix-in-the-market [https://perma.cc/ZK9Y-57
M4] (“ETFs, like stocks, can be bought and sold in milliseconds. But bank loans cannot.
Loans trade in over-the-counter markets with much less volume and settlement times that can
stretch out a month.”).
531. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 210, 225 (2008).
532. Morgan Ricks, Regulating Money Creation After the Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. REV. 75,
78 (2011).
533. See id. at 119–20.
534. See Pozsar, Adrian, Ashcraft & Boesky supra note 218, at 61–64 (discussing the
“shadow” banking system and the government’s intervention to support it during the GFC);
BLINDER, supra note 51, at 147–48; Logan, Nelson & Parkinson, supra note 217, at 9–11.
535. See William A. Birdthistle, Breaking Bucks in Money Market Funds, 2010 WIS. L.
REV. 1155, 1163, 1190.
536. See supra Section III(iv)(e).
840 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OFBUSINESS LAW [Vol. 22:4
unprecedented move to mitigate the economic fallout from the
coronavirus,537 on March 23, 2020, the Federal Reserve established the
Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility with authorization to purchase
investment grade corporate ETFs.538 Now that the government is supporting
the ETF market, perhaps firms providing such liquidity transformation
services should have heightened safeguards.
While ETFs have many benefits, and strong demand factors,539 their
popularity has also spawned complex interconnected ETF mega firms with
growing influence over the decisions of nearly every publicly traded
corporation in America.540 In many ways, ETFs are a “tragedy of the
commons” problem, where what’s good for the individual is sub-optimal for
the group.541 Empirically, there’s a “real prospect” that these ETF firms will
one day have voting control over all large publicly traded companies in
America.542 These mega ETF sponsors are growing to an unprecedented
size,543 while fostering deep and complex interconnections.544 The popularity
of ETFs gives rise to systemic risks not otherwise present in other managed
asset classes like those associated with the arbitrage function and derived
from directional and noise traders attracted to the liquidity of ETFs; yet it
has also reinforced common concerns like securities lending.545 Post-GFC
reforms have not curbed the growth and concentration of the largest asset
managers, just as they haven’t prevented a few mega-banks from becoming
the most important players in nearly all of the world derivatives
clearinghouses.546 These same mega banks also happen to be some of the
largest APs in the ETF ecosystem.547
537. See Andrea Riquier, The Fed Is Going to Buy ETFs. What Does It Mean?
MARKETWATCH (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-fed-is-going-to-
buy-etfs-what-does-it-mean-2020-03-23 [https://perma.cc/S5Y8-5VZQ].
538. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Policy Tools, Secondary Market
Corporate Credit Facility, https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/smccf.htm [https
://perma.cc/T6DH-YCJL].
539. See supra Section III(iii).
540. See supra Section III(iv)(b).
541. See Conrad de Aenlle, Opinion: John Bogle has a Warning for Index Fund Investors,
MARKETWATCH (June 1, 2017), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/john-bogle-has-a- war
ning-for-index-fund-investors-2017-06-01 [https://perma.cc/49EU-WLS5].
542. See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 6, at 737–41.
543. SeeDawn Lim, BlackRock’s Assets Blow Past $7 Trillion in Milestone for Investment
Giant, THEWALLSTREET JOURNAL (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/blackrocks-
assets-blow-past-7-trillion-in-milestone-for-investment-giant-11579089828 [https://perma.c
c/PDB4-ZKLP].
544. See supra Section III (iv).
545. Id.
546. See Alvarez & McPartland, supra note 20, at 11–19;
547. See BLACKROCK, A Primer, supra note 169, at 3 (BlackRock lists the following
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Interconnectivity in financial markets can both absorb and amplify
shocks, making them at once “robust” and “fragile.”548 It’s increasingly
prudent to consider financial markets together as a “system” and design
regulatory structures in this light.549 Systemic risk in this sector is most likely
to be a by-product of the collective actions of a myriad of interconnected
counterparts and manifest through phenomena such as discretionary
withdrawals of key market-incentivized intermediaries, and crowd behaviors
from correlated exposures giving rise to information cascades, runs, fire
sales, and non-linear impacts.550 The FSOC’s activity and entity-based
frameworks, when evaluated individually for ETFs, have limitations. As
advocated by previous scholars,551 it would be prudent to not consider these
approaches as mutually exclusive but look at them as complimentary, and
this is particularly true for the ETF mega-players. These giant asset
managers may be growing “too connected to fail,” and the most effective
regulatory framework will require a cross-market “system-wide” toolkit to
monitor and assess the collective behavior of all participants.552
ETFs as a financial market case study highlight externalities associated
with complex systems including what Andrew Haldane identifies as tensions
in robustness and fragility onset through complexity and “homogeneity,”
“feedback effects” in periods of heightened stress, unknown risks (the so
called “Knightian uncertainties”), and network “dimensionality” due to
financial innovation.553 Haldane suggests that given these dynamics, policy
prescriptions should increasingly include access to data to map the global
financial network, improved communication across the network, regulations
to “vaccinate the ‘super-spreaders’ to avert financial contagion,” and the
implementation of safeguards against the “network’s dimensionality and
complexity.”554 As a result, there is merit in ensuring that the most centrally
connected entity in this ETF ecosystem – the issuer itself – is economically
resilient and has adequate safeguards and controls in place, while also
assessing activities across the network and the behavior of its numerous
interconnected participants.555
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UBS Securities, Virtu.”).
548. See Haldane, supra note 13, at 3–5.
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